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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
. Wendell Bosley
guilty

from the restitution order entered

to disturbing the

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Kaitlin Timlin and two friends were walking outside in downtown Coeur
D'Alene after leaving a bar. (R., pp.10-11.) They were approached by a man
who began to argue with Kaitlin about football. (Id.) The man then exclaimed, "!
don't need to take shit from a bitch," and struck Timlin in the right side of her
face, knocking her unconscious. (Id.) One of Timlin's friends then struck the
man and knocked him to the ground. (Id.) Timlin suffered a subcranial brain
aneurysm and was hospitalized. (R., p.1 O; Tr., 1 p.23, Ls.14-20.)
Responding officers located and identified Bosley at the scene standing
approximately 10 feet from Timlin. (R., pp.12-13.) They observed him to have
numerous abrasions on his forehead. (Id.) Bosley told the officer that he had
been arguing with Timlin about football when one of Timlin's friends stuck him
without provocation. (Id.) Bosley also told the officers that he was "not going to
go down for hitting a girl." (Id.)
The state charged Bosley with aggravated battery.

(R., pp.37-38.)

However, prior to trial, Bosley agreed to plead guilty to an amended charge of

In its Respondent's brief, the state cites only to the transcript that contains the
change of plea, sentencing, restitution hearings. The state refers to this
transcript as "Tr."
1

1

disturbing the peace. 2 (R., pp.100-102.) A written plea agreement indicated that
ag

to "pay restitution." (R., p.102.)

the change

hearing,

Bosley indicated that he "agreed to be responsible for restitution that will be
determined on a later date at a hearing." (Tr., p.7, Ls.13-17.) The district court
imposed 180 days jail with 170 suspended, with 40 hours in the Sherriff s
Community Labor Program in lieu of 10 days jail. (R., p.113.)
The state requested the district court to order Bosley to pay restitution in
the amounts of $400 to the Idaho Industrial Commission for payments made to
Timlin to compensate for lost wages due to missed work; and $2,730 to Timlin
herself, for non-refundable tuition payments made for classes she was unable to
attend.

(R., pp.108-109, 111, 118.)

Bosley filed a written objection and

requested a hearing with regard to the proposed $2,730 restitution for Timlin.
(R., p.114.)
At the hearing, Timlin testified and the state presented evidence
supporting the $2,730 restitution request. (Tr., p.23, L.7 - p.33, L.19.) Bosley
argued that the court should not order restitution because there was no causal
nexus between the punch that knocked Timlin unconscious and the crime Bosley
actually pied guilty to - disturbing the peace. (Tr., p.35, L.8 - p.36, L.25.) Bosley
also argued that even if there was such a nexus, restitution for Timlin's. nonrefundable tuition payments was not appropriate because it was an expense that

2

The amended information alleged that Bosley disturbed Timlin's peace by
"tumultuous conduct, offensive conduct, threatening, quarreling, fighting and/or
challenging to a fight." (R., p.100) At the change of plea hearing, Bosley did not
admit or deny striking Timlin. (See Tr., p.5, L.4 - p.13, L.15.)
2

Timlin was going to incur regardless of whether she had been injured. (Tr., p.37,
Ls.1-17.)
The court concluded that pursuant to the plea agreement, Bosley agreed
to pay Timlin restitution for injuries suffered as a result of the attack. (Tr., p.39,
L.6 - p.40, L.21.)

The court also found that Timlin's non-refundable tuition

payments constituted an economic loss resulting from the attack. (Tr., p.40, L.24
- p.42, L.17.)

The court then imposed a restitution order in the amounts

requested by the state. (R., pp.126-127.) Bosley timely appealed. (R., pp.128131.)

3

ISSUE
states the issue on appeal as:
Did the Court err in finding the defendant had agreed to
restitution for uncharged conduct?
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as:
Has Bosley failed to show that the district court erred in concluding that he
had agreed to pay restitution to Kaitlin Timlin for economic losses caused by the
conduct for which he was originally charged?
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ARGUMENT
Bosley Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Concluding That He
Agreed To Pay Restitution To Kaitlin Timlin For Economic Losses Caused By
The Conduct For VVhich He Was Originally Charged
Introd uctio n
that

the district court erred in
agreed, pursuant to

agreement, to pay restitution to

Timlin

economic losses caused by the attack for which Bosley was originally charged.
(Appellant's brief, pp.6-9.) Bosley's claim fails because a review of the
plea agreement and the transcript of Bosley's change

plea hearing reveal

existence of his unambiguous agreement to pay restitution.

B.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation and legal effect of a clear and unambiguous plea

agreement, and determinations of whether plea agreements are ambiguous, are
matters of law subject to free review on appeal. State v. Lutes, 141 Idaho 911,
914, 120 P.3d 299, 302 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Allen, 143 Idaho 267, 272, 141
P.3d 1136, 1141 (Ct. App. 2006).

C.

The Terms Of Bosley's Plea Agreement Required Him To Pay Restitution
To Kaitlin Timlin For Economic Losses Resulting From The Attack
Plea agreements are contractual in nature and generally are examined by

courts in accordance with contract law standards. State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71,
73, 106 P.3d 397, 399 (2005). "As with other contracts, provisions of plea
agreements are occasionally ambiguous; the government 'ordinarily must bear
responsibility for any lack of clarity."' State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 596, 226
5

3d 535, 538 (2010) (quoting United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1338
(9th Cir.1993)).
In this case, both the text of the written plea agreement and statements
made by Bosley and his counsel during the change of plea hearing show that
Bosley unambiguously agreed to pay restitution to Kaitlin Timlin, and that a
subsequent restitution hearing would determine the amount of such restitution,
and whether any requested restitution constituted economic loss that resulted
from the attack.
The state extended a written "pretrial settlement offer," which Bosley
accepted and signed.

(R., p.102.)

The written agreement contained a list of

stock terms with corresponding check-boxes.

(Id.) The corresponding check-

box for the term, "Pay restitution," was marked.

(Id.)

Initially, the written

agreement identified specific amounts to be paid to the Idaho Industrial
Commission's Crime Victim Fund, and to Katilin Timlin, but these entries were
crossed out and replaced by a notation stating, "subject to hearing." (Id.)
At the change of plea hearing, Bosley's defense attorney described the
plea agreement to the district court, stating, "we have also agreed to have a
restitution hearing at a later date on - to determine the amount of restitution."
(Tr., p.5, Ls.22-24.)

The district court asked Bosley, "you've agreed to be

responsible for restitution that will be determined on a later date at a hearing; is
that correct?" (Tr., p.7, Ls.13-16.) Bosley responded in the affirmative. (Tr., p.7,
L.17.)

6

Bosley therefore plainly agreed to pay restitution in this case, subject to
determinations regarding the appropriate amount, and implicitly, whether
requested restitution constituted economic loss actually caused by the attack.
There is no ambiguity as to which victim or incident was the subject of the
restitution agreement.

There was only one victim named in the amended

charging information, Kaitlin Timlin. (R., p.100.) There was only one act which
resulted in the injuries for which restitution was sought - Bosley's punch to
Tirnlin's head. (See R., pp.37-38; Tr., p.23, Ls.14-24.) Therefore, by agreeing to
pay restitution, Bosley necessarily agreed to pay restitution for economic losses
that resulted from this punch.
On appeal, Bosley also contends that the district court incorrectly
construed the plea agreement as requiring him to pay restitution for any manner
of alleged economic loss set forth by the state, and that the court precluded him
from objecting to any restitution request on the ground that it was unrelated to the
attack. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-9.) Bosley's contention is incorrect because he
fails to recognize the separate and distinct conclusions made by the district court
after the restitution hearing. First, the court found that Bosley did, in fact, agree
to pay restitution for Timlin's economic losses resulting from the punch that
knocked her unconscious. (Tr., p.39, L.6 - p.40, L.21.)

However, Timlin was

still permitted to argue that Timlin's non-refundable tuition payments were not
caused by that punch, but were instead an expense that Timlin was going to
incur regardless of any injury. (Tr., p.37, Ls.1-17.) In fact, rather than preclude
Bosley from objecting to restitution for the tuition payments on this ground, the

7

court stated the opposite, that Bosley had "the right to question [restitution for
tuition payments] because we had agreed to set a hearing up." (Tr., p.40,
p.41, L.3.) The court went on to reject Bosley's argument, and found that the
tuition payments did constitute economic loss resulting from Bosley's conduct.
(Tr., p.41, L.4- p.42, L.17.) Bosley has not challenged this finding on appeal. 3
Bosley also appears to contend that any agreement he made to "pay
restitution" pertained only to his subsequent stipulation to pay $400 to the crime
victims fund for payments it made to Timlin for lost wages that resulted from the
attack. (Appellant's brief, p.8.) Bosley, however, has not attempted to explain
the basis of any distinction, in terms of the plea agreement, between this $400
restitution award, and the proposed $2,730 restitution which was requested for
Timlin's non-refundable tuition payments. Both proposed restitution awards were
intended to compensate Timlin for economic losses suffered as a result of the
attack.
In fact, rather than support his position, Bosley's stipulation to pay $400 to
the crime victims' fund supports the position of the state. Bosley agreed to pay
$400 to compensate Timlin for economic loss suffered as a result of the attack.

3

While Bosley has not challenged the district court's determination that Timlin's
non-refundable tuition payments constituted economic loss resulting from
Bosley's attack, the state asserts that the court's determination was correct. For
the purposes of criminal restitution, "Economic loss" includes, but is not limited
to, "the value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, lost
wages, and direct out-of-pocket losses or. expenses." I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a). At
the restitution hearing, Timlin testified that as a result of the injuries she suffered
from the attack, she was unable to attend classes. for which she had paid nonrefundable tuition. (Tr., p.23, L.10 - p.27, L.8.) As the district court properly
reasoned, Timlin's situation was analogous to one in which an individual
purchased a car which was subsequently destroyed by a criminal act. (Tr., p.41,
L.4 - p.42, L.5.)
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(Tr., p.21, L.23 - p.22, L.2.) At the restitution hearing, however, contrary to the
inherent concession in his stipulation, Bosley argued that the proposed $2,730
restitution payment was inappropriate because there was no proximate cause
between the attack and the crime he actually pied guilty to, disturbing the peace.
(Tr., p.35, L.8 - p.36, L.25.) If Bosiey's plea agreement bound him to pay $400
to the crime victims fund despite the nature of the crime he actually pied guilty to,
as Bosley appears to concede, it also bound him to pay $2,730 to Timlin for nonrefundable tuition payments, if those payments also constituted economic losses
caused by the attack.

As noted above, Bosley had the opportunity to argue that

these payments did not constitute economic losses caused by the attack, but the
court rejected his argument, and Bosley has not challenged this determination on
appeal.
Bosley agreed, pursuant to his plea agreement, to pay restitution to Kaitlin
Timlin for economic losses caused by the attack for which Bosley was originally
charged.

Bosley has therefore failed to show that the district court erred by

holding him to this agreement, and by ordering him to pay restitution as
requested by the state.

9

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
restitution
DATED this 11th day of December, 2013.

MARK W. OLSoiJ'
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11th day of December 2013, I caused
two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be
placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
JAY LOGSDON
Deputy Public Defender
400 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

Mark W. Olson
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/pm
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